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GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER* 
 
Debate over the utility of economic sanctions remains brisk and 
their use has certainly not diminished. In our recent book, Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered 3d edition, my colleagues and I examined 
204 episodes over the past century and concluded that, in about 
one-third of the episodes, economic sanctions succeeded to some 
degree in achieving their foreign policy goals.1  The one-third rate 
may not seem terrific, but it does contradict the common statement 
that “sanctions never work.”  We found that the success of 
economic sanctions depends on various factors—including the 
type of goal sought, the economic and political context in the target 
country, and the manner in which the sanctions were 
implemented.  For practitioners, the important question is how to 
design sanctions so they work better. 
Since the end of the Cold War, sanctions policies have shifted 
dramatically.  The decline of super power rivalry coupled with the 
force of globalization changed the objectives and geographic locus 
of sanctions and introduced new players into the game: non-state 
actors (both benign non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) 
and malign terrorists and drug traffickers) along with different 
layers of government (notably Congress, and many states and 
cities).  Sanctions policies have consequently targeted a wider 
spectrum of issues such as ethnic strife, civil chaos, human rights, 
democracy, narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Authors in this 
symposium issue delve into the new aspects and deliver a wealth 
of thoughtful analysis. 
 
* Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. My research assistant Jisun Kim helped prepare this introduction. 
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Reflecting its role as economic, political and military super 
power, the United States has long been the predominant sender 
country. The incidence of U.S. unilateral actions has fallen 
dramatically since the Second World War, but economic sanctions 
remain an important tool of U.S. foreign policy.  To carry out its 
designs in recent decades, the United States often seeks 
cooperation from other countries. 
Since the 1990s, non-state actors, such as Osama bin Laden’s al 
Qaeda network, have increasingly launched attacks against the 
United States and its allies.  The 9/11 attack in 2001 shocked the 
United States and much of international society, and triggered the 
“war on terrorism.”  Iran rose high on the list of the intelligence 
community and was seen as a danger to the United States and its 
allies.  The Iranian government has funded non-state terrorists, 
notably Hamas and Hezbollah, and has continued to pursue 
nuclear weapons.  Since 1983, when Iran was implicated in the 
terrorist bombing in Lebanon, the United States has incrementally 
raised its barriers on trade and investment with Iran, especially 
targeting the Iranian oil industry, the country’s main source of 
revenue.  In 1996, Congress enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act (“ILSA”) which supplemented existing measures with 
additional restrictions on foreign companies that undertake new 
oilfield investments in Iran. When terminated with respect to 
Libya, the act was renamed the Iran Sanctions Act, and extended 
until December 31, 2011.2 However, sanctions have not successfully 
blunted Iranian determination to develop nuclear weapons and 
fund terrorists. 
In his Article A New Sanction for a New Century: Treasury’s 
Innovative Use of Banking Sanctions, Orde F. Kittrie, law professor at 
Arizona State University, examines the utility of the banking 
sanctions on Iran.  These sanctions are enforced by the Treasury 
Department.  Using banking restrictions, the United States has 
tried to interrupt Iran’s access to normal financial channels in ways 
that might support nuclear and terrorist activities.  The U.S. 
government has persuaded some foreign governments as well as 
individual foreign firms to cooperate with these efforts.  The active 
engagement of the Treasury Department has improved intelligence 
about global financial transactions.  As a result, financial sanctions 
 
2 KENNETH KATZMAN, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 
at 3, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports 
/RS20871.pdf. 
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are better able to target specific individuals, firms or governmental 
agencies that might be engaged in misdeeds.  Kittrie recommends 
that more nations should grant their finance ministries the 
authority to use intelligence with similar goals in mind. There is 
much to be said for this recommendation: among the 204 sanctions 
episodes documented in our study, my colleagues and I found that 
sixty-two episodes entailed a combination of financial and trade 
sanctions, and that this combination has higher success rates on 
average than trade sanctions only—40 percent of the time versus 25 
percent.3  
Under the Obama administration, the Treasury Department 
seems likely to maintain this approach.  In his written responses, 
dated January 21, 2009, to members of the Senate Finance 
Committee, Treasury Secretary-designate Timothy Geithner stated 
that:  
Vigorous sanctions are an essential means for forcing 
nations that foster terror financing and weapons 
proliferation to choose between defiance and responsible 
engagement with the world. . . . I would consider the full 
range of tools available to the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, including unilateral measures, to prevent Iran 
from misusing the financial system to engage in 
proliferation and terrorism.4 
Another noticeable development in U.S. sanctions policies is 
more extensive use of secondary sanctions. Since the 1990s, the 
United States, at both the federal and state level, has threatened or 
invoked secondary boycotts against parties that abetted the target 
country.  For example, the Helms-Burton Act targeting Cuba, and 
ILSA targeting Iran and Libya, both included provisions to impose 
sanctions against foreign companies doing business with the target 
countries.  These acts sparked a serious backlash in the European 
Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada, all of which have 
commercial interests in the target countries.  Some of the objecting 
countries enacted their own laws to counteract the effect of US 
 
3 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 170.  
4 Finance Committee Questions for the Record: Hearing on Confirmation of Mr. 
Timothy F. Geithner to be Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury Before the S. 
Comm. On Finance, 111th Cong. 50, 67 (2009) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner), 
avialable at http://www.finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202009/012209 
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measures, and they threatened to bring a case in the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”). But Presidents Clinton and Bush both used 
their waiver authority to avert an eruption of trade disputes. 
Today, a recurring question is whether to sanction China because it 
carries on oil investments in Sudan. 
In his Article, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, Jeffrey A. 
Meyer, associate law professor of Quinnipiac University, explores 
the legality of secondary sanctions under customary international 
law.  He contends that secondary sanctions can not be categorically 
dismissed as improperly “extraterritorial” since they are no more 
impermissible or extraterritorial than conventional primary 
sanctions. He argues that conventional primary sanctions also seek 
to change extraterritorial behavior, even when they are applied 
only against U.S. companies doing business in the target country.  
Therefore, if secondary sanctions are well-tailored and grounded 
on “terrinational” principles—the combination of territorial and 
nationality jurisdiction—meaning that measures regulate only the 
conduct of the sender country’s nationals within its own 
territory—they should be, in Meyer’s view, regarded as legally 
permissible. 
Secondary sanctions imposed by state and city governments 
have raised concerns not only about international legal issues but 
also about the possible infringement of federal authority. The 
National Foreign Trade Council (“NFTC”) brought a case against 
the state of Massachusetts regarding “the Massachusetts Burma 
law,” adopted in 1996, which prohibited the state from purchasing 
goods and services from corporations doing business with Burma.5  
While the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal law preempted 
“the Massachusetts Burma law,” the Court’s decision was not 
grounded on constitutional interpretation, but only on the fact that 
Congress had passed a corresponding (and therefore preemptive) 
law sanctioning Burma.6 
In his Article, Darfur, Divestment and Dialogue, Perry S. Bechky, 
visiting assistant professor at the University of Connecticut law 
school, focuses on state-mandated divestment—one form of 
 
5 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
6 Id. at 388. The Massachusetts law was also challenged in the WTO by the 
European Union and Japan in 1997, arguing that the law violated the WTO’s 
government procurement agreement.  However, the European Union and Japan 
suspended the WTO case when the federal lawsuit was filed against 
Massachusetts by the NFTC.  
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secondary sanctions—imposed on Sudan for atrocities in Darfur.  
He addresses constitutional concerns regarding participation of 
sub-federal governments in the formation of US foreign policy.  In 
2003, a rebellion started in the Western Sudanese region of Darfur; 
in response, the Sudanese government mounted horrible attacks 
against civilians in Darfur.  The crisis in Darfur presented a moral 
challenge to the world.7  Citing Darfur in 2006, the United States 
expanded its sanctions already in place against Sudan.  To date, 
twenty-seven U.S. states, the District of Columbia and twenty cities 
have all participated in divestment aimed at companies doing 
business in Sudan.  Despite constitutional concerns, the US 
Congress authorized states to enact these measures when it 
adopted the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (“SADA”) 
in 2007.  Bechky argues that the divestment movements taken by 
states and cities should be understood as an effort to send a strong 
message to the federal government and to boost political support 
for wider action, rather than as a constitutional disturbance to the 
conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 
In his Article, Using Sociological Theories of Isomorphism to 
Evaluate the Possibility of Regime Change Through Trade Sanction, 
unlike studies that examine trade sanctions in the context of 
economic theory, Philip M. Nichols, associate professor at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, takes a new 
approach.  He examines trade sanctions in the sociological view of 
three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change8—namely 
normative isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive 
isomorphism.  Normative isomorphism stems from professional 
pressures which spring from similar training and networks. 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when one institution mimics another. 
Coercive isomorphism describes convergence in institutions as a 
response to incentives which can be either positive or negative. 
Nichols seeks to explain the relation between trade sanctions 
and changes in institutions within the context of these three 
mechanisms.  He takes Cuba as an example and examines why 
 
7 While the United Nations has been reluctant to define these atrocities as 
“genocide” under the Genocide Convention, the United States and some other 
countries have labeled the crisis as “genocide.”  Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A (III), 3d Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948), available at http://www.preventgenocide.org 
/law/convention/text.htm. 
8 Isomorphism refers to similar behavior by organizations facing similar 
conditions. 
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Cuban institutions became similar to institutions of socialists 
countries, notably the Soviet Union.  Trade sanctions imposed on 
Cuba sharply curtailed its interaction with democratic countries. 
Cuba was thus excluded from participating in the Organization of 
American States and instead joined the Soviet Union’s Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance.  This increased the migration of 
Soviet and Eastern European technical advisors and economic 
planners to Cuba, and led Cuban institutions to become more 
similar to those in the Soviet Union (normative isomorphism).   
Isolation also gave Cuba more opportunity to copy the institutions 
of those Soviet countries (mimetic isomorphism). Nichols also 
argues that trade sanctions enhanced the incentives offered from 
socialist countries (coercive isomorphism). 
Nichols concludes that this sociological approach suggests that 
trade sanctions may not produce the expected outcome but even 
go the wrong direction.  My colleagues and I share this conclusion. 
Our reasons for failure include the proposition that sanctions 
create their own antidotes both by sparking a nationalist reaction 
and by prompting powerful allies of the target country to assume 
the role of “black knights”—both evident features in the Cuban 
case.9 
Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts in Africa have raised 
grave concerns about the collapse of democracy and human rights.  
The European Union and the United Nations have taken serious 
actions against strife, mass killings, and despotic leadership in 
Africa.  Reflecting these concerns, both democratization and 
human rights have become a popular goal in recent episodes.   
However, in our study, my colleagues and I found that sanctions 
are often less effective when aimed against autocratic nations than 
democratic countries.10  Autocratic regimes are better able to shift 
the burden of external economic pressure on to the least influential 
groups in society. 
In their Article, Economic Sanctions, Leadership Survival, and 
Human Rights, Christiane Carneiro and Dominique Elden explored 
the impact of economic sanctions on human rights. They seek to 
answer how leadership change resulting from economic sanctions 
might affect human rights. To answer this question, Carneiro and 
Elden examine four countries: Turkey; Fiji; Pakistan; and Sierra 
 
       9    HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.  
10 Id. at 166–68.  
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Leone, all subjects of economic sanctions. Carneiro and Elden 
argue that economic development and democratization may have 
adverse impacts on human rights since they are often associated 
with strong leadership which in turn can be accompanied by 
political repression. Therefore, when economic sanctions aimed at 
promoting democracy are imposed—in particular, when sanctions 
target autocracies—the resulting political pressures may adversely 
affect the level of human rights protection. This is an intriguing 
proposition and, as the authors note, deserves further inquiry. 
This is a fine symposium. Scholars and practitioners alike will 
find much value in these Articles. 
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